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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE MAKING THE JURY THE
JUDGE OF THE LAW AND THE FACTS IN CRIMINAL CASES.-Ben

Bruner,' on trial in the Criminal Court of Cook County upon
an indictment charging robbery with a gun, requested that the
following instruction be given to the jury: "The court instructs the jury that they are the judges of the law as well as
the facts of this case, and if they can say upon their oaths that
they know the law better than the court does, they have a right
to do so; but before assuming so solemn a responsibility they
should be assured that they are not acting from caprice or
prejudice, that they are not controlled by their wills or their
wishes, but from deep and confident conviction that the court is
wrong and that they are right. Before saying this upon their
oaths, it is their duty to reflect whether, from their study and
experience, they are better qualified to judge of the law than
the court; if, under all the circumstances, they are prepared to
say that the court is wrong in its exposition of the law, the
statute has given them the right." The court refused to give
1 The People v. Bruner, 343 Ill. 146.
149
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this instruction, but gave instead, the instruction requested by
the state, as follows: "The court is the sole judge of the law
in the case, and it becomes the duty of the jury to follow the
law as it is given to it by the court in his instructions. You have
no right to disregard it, or disregard any portion thereof; but
you are bound to take the whole of it as it is given to you by
the court and apply it to this case." The defendant was found
guilty, and sued out his writ of error in the Supreme Court
of Illinois, assigning as error the court's ruling in regard to
the above mentioned instructions.
The refused instruction was couched in almost identical language with
that of the Illinois Supreme Court in Schnier v. The
People,2 and was based upon Section 11 of Division 13 of the
Criminal Code,3 which provides that "Juries in all criminal
cases shall be judges of the law and the 4fact." This is a reenactment of an identical statute of 1827.
The trial court justified its refusal of the first and the giving
of the second instruction on the grounds that this statute is
unconstitutional, in that it contravenes Section 5 of Article 2 of
the Constitution of 1870, "that the right of trial by jury as
heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate," and the third article
of the Constitution which distributes the powers of the state government among the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, and prohibits the exercise, except as expressly directed
or permitted, by any person or collection of persons constituting
one of these departments, of any power properly belonging to
either of the other departments.
Mr. Justice DeYoung delivered the opinion of the Supreme
Court, affirming the decision of the lower court. Briefly, the
court finds that "the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed" means the right as it existed at common law, and that at
common law the jury was bound to take the law as laid down by
the court. Therefore, as this is the right guaranteed by the
Constitution, and as the legislature cannot exercise judicial
power, the statute making the jury judges of the law, as well
as the fact, cannot be sustained.
Mr. Justice DeYoung, to substantiate his first holding that the
jury in criminal cases answers only as to the facts, states that
the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution of 1870
is the same right as that guaranteed by the Constitution of 1848,
"that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate," and that
guaranteed by the Constitution of 1818, "that the right of trial
Ill. 11.
8 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St., 1931, Ch. 38, par. 764.
4 Revised Code of 1827, p. 163.
2 23
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by jury shall remain inviolate." To determine what this right
is, he says, it is necessary to resort to the common law of England. Mr. DeYoung cites Coke: "Ad quaestionem facti nwn
respondent judices, ad quaestionem juris non respondent juratores. "

5

But even the most superficial research into early English cases
will reveal that this question-the right of the jury to determine
both law and fact in criminal cases-has been the source of bitter
controversy for a very long period of time.
Two hundred and eighty years before Ben Bruner's requested
instruction was refused, we find Colonel Lilburne, on trial for
treason, stoutly asserting that " 'The jury by law are not only
judges of fact but of law also, and you who call yourselves judges
of the law, are no more but Norman intruders, and indeed and
in truth, if the jury please, are no more but cyphers to pronounce their verdict.' " Mr. Justice Jermine hotly replied,
" 'Was there ever such a damnable blasphemous heresy as this,
to call the judges of the law cyphers ?' "6
The justice's characterization of the contention as "a damnable blasphemous heresy" was not sufficient, however, to keep
Mr. Pratt, later Lord Camden, when moving before Lord Mansfield for leave to file the information (in the case of King v.
Shebbeare)7 to say, "It is merely to put the matter in the way of
trial; for I admit, and his lordship well knows, that the jury
are the judges of the law as well as the fact." But Mansfield
instructed the jury the other way. In a later case,8 Camden
carried the argument to the House of Lords, where Lord Chatham, arguing against Mansfield's instruction, said, "I always
understood that the jury were competent judges of the law as
well as the fact; and, indeed, if they were not, I can see no
essential benefit from their institution to the community." 9
Fox's Libel Act, in 1791,10 settled the controversy in favor of
Camden's contention-though limited, it is true, to libel suits.
By this Act, the determination of whether or not a writing was
libelous was left exclusively to the jury. Significantly enough,
the Act was deemed declaratory, since in its beginning it recited
that it was "therefore declared and enacted."
Naturally enough, in the American Colonies, the consensus of
opinion was heartily in favor of Lord Camden's contention, for
5

Co. Litt. 155 b.

6 Trial of Colonel Lilburne, (2nd Ed.) 107.
7 Hilary

Term, 31 Geo. II 1758, K. B. Mss.

8 Woodfall's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 869.
9 16 Parl. Hist. 1302-1307.
10 32 Geo. III, c. 60.
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the colonists regarded the King's judges with suspicion. "John
Adams, in his diary for February 12, 1771, in a passage which is
probably either an extract from or a memorandum of a speech
before the Colonial Legislature, urges that in the then state of
things public policy demanded that not only in criminal but in
civil cases juries should be at liberty to take the law in their
own hands. "1
It is apparent that John Adams entertained no doubt whatever that the jury determined the law as well as the facts in
criminal as well as in civil cases. Nor was Mr. Adams alone in
his opinion. Chief Justice Jay, of the United States Supreme.
Court, charging the jury in Georgia v. Brailsford12 said, "It
may not be amiss here, gentlemen, to remind you of the good
old rule that on questions of fact it is the province of the jury,
on questions of law it is the province of the court to decide.
But it must be observed that by the same law which recognizes
this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction you have nevertheless
a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy."
When we remember that this was a civil case, and not a criminal one, Justice Jay's statement shows the lengths to which this
idea had run.
In People v. Crosswell,13 no less an authority than Chancellor
Kent upholds the right of the jury to determine the law as well
as the facts.
During Bowen's Trial 14 in Massachusetts, in 1816, the court
said, "In all capital cases, the jury are the judges of the law and
fact. The court are to direct them in matters of law, and
although it is safer for them to rely on instructions delivered
from that source, still, gentlemen, they are to decide for themselves. "
Of course, ever since Bushell's Case, 15 it has never been
doubted that the jury had the power to disregard the law as laid
down by the judge. And, neither in England nor America, has
it ever been held, at least within the last three hundred years,
that a jury could not, by returning a verdict of "Not Guilty"
determine both the law and the fact as to the case at issue. Mr.
Justice Gray is considering this when he says in his dissenting
opinion in Sparf and Hansen v. United States:16 "Upon the
11 Wharton,

Criminal Procedure,
Dall. (U. S.) 1.
13 3 Johns. Cas. 337.
14 Bowen's Trial, 51.
15 Vaughan 135.
16 156 U. S. 51.
123

(10th Ed.) Vol. III, sec. 1745.
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facts, although the judge may state his view of them, the duty
of decision remains with the jury, and cannot be thrown by them
upon the judge. Upon the law involved in the issue of fact, the
jury, if they are satisfied to do so, may let it be decided by the
judge, either by returning a general verdict in accordance with
his opinion as expressed to them, or by returning a special verdict reciting the facts as found by them, and, by thus separating
the law from the facts, put the question of law in shape to be
decided by the court in a more formal manner. But the whole
issue, complicated of law and fact, being submitted to their
determination, the law does not require of them to separate the
law from the fact, but authorizes them to decide both at once
by a general verdict."
But the majority of the court decided contrary to Justice
Gray. Georgia v. Brailsford has never been followed and authority in this country is overwhelmingly to the contrary. Sparf
and Hansen v. United States has settled the question once for
all as far as United States courts are concerned. Mr. DeYoung,
in his opinion in the Bruner case, cites thirty-five cases from
twenty-two different states, holding that the jury determines
facts only. Granted, then, that this question is no longer open
to argument.
It is equally plain, however, that the question was not definitely settled until the last hundred years. It can hardly be
imagined that such men as Camden, Jay, John Adams, and Chancellor Kent would support a doctrine which had been definitely
discarded by the authorities. We must understand, then, that
there were not wanting authorities on both sides of the argument
in the early nineteenth century.
The first Constitution of the State of Illinois was adopted in
1818. And the statute in question, it will be remembered, was
first made law in 1827.
"In the construction of the language of the Constitution
*
*
we are to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the
condition of the men who framed that instrument."' 17 For the
time being, therefore, let us imagine that we are examining
the Statute of 1827 (which was identical with that of 1874) to
determine whether or not it is in conflict with the Constitution
of 1818, which, Mr. DeYoung says, guarantees the same right
to a jury trial as the Constitution of 1870.
The question before us may be compared to the question which
presents itself to a judge who is asked to set aside a verdict
on the grounds that it is against the weight of the evidence.
He does not ask himself, "Would I, upon this evidence, have
17 Ex

parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1.
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found the same way as the jury has found?" but instead "Considering all the evidence, is it possible that reasonable men could
reach this verdict?" If the second question is answered in the
affirmative the answer to the first does not matter, for the
verdict must stand. A similar question presents itself to the
court when passing upon the constitutionality of a statute.
This principle was expressed by Justice Harris in The People
v. The Supervisors of Orange.'s "A legislative act is not to be
declared void upon a mere conflict of interpretation between the
legislative and judicial power. Before proceeding to annul, by
judicial sentence, what has been enacted by the law-making
power, it should clearly appear that the act cannot be supported
by any reasonable intendment or allowable presumption."
In the Sinking Fund Cases,' 9 Chief Justice Waite said,
"Every possible presumption is in favor of the validity of a
statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a
rational doubt."
Justice Charlton, in Grimball v. Ross, 20 said, "No nice doubts,
no critical exposition of words, no abstract rules of interpretation suitable in a contest between individuals, ought to be resorted
to in deciding upon the constitutional operation of a statute.
This violation of a constitutional right ought to be as obvious
to the comprehension of every one as an axiomatic truth, as
that the parts are equal to the whole."
Chief Justice Tilghman, in Commonwealth v. Smith,2 ' puts
it, "For weighty reasons, it has been assumed as a principle in
construing constitutions by the Supreme Court of the United
States, by this court and every other court of reputation in
the United States, that an act of the legislature is not to be
declared void unless the violation of the constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt."
Nor is Illinois a stranger to this doctrine. The court says,
in The People v. Brady,22 "Every presumption is indulged in
favor of the validity of a statute and every reasonable doubt
Substantially the same language is used
resolved in its favor."
23
in six earlier cases.
1817 N. Y. 235.

19 Union Pacific Railroad Company v. United States and Central
Pacific Railroad Company v. Gallatin, 99 U. S. 700.
20 T. U. P. Charlt. 175.
21 13 Pa. 117.
22 262 Ill. 578.

376; The People v. Hazelwood, 116 Ill.
23 Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill.
319; The People v. Nelson et al., 133 Ill. 565; Berry v. City of Chicago,
192 Ill. 154; Village of Donovan v. Donovan, 236 Il. 636; City of
Chicago v. Lowenthal, 242 Ill. 404.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

In other words, the Constitution
read together and reconciled if it is
expressed by Mr. James B. Thayer,
not what is the true meaning of the
legislation is sustainable or not.' 24

and the statute must be
possible to do so. Or, as
"The ultimate question is
Constitution, but whether

Applying this reasoning to the problem before us, what do
we find? In 1818, the question as to the respective provinces
of judge and jury was a highly controversial one. The constitution adopted by the people of the State of Illinois provides
that "the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." What
did this provision mean in 1818? We cannot say, with absolute
certainty, for at that time there were two schools of thought on
the subject. Now, it is true, we have very definitely decided
which one of these ideas was wrong, but remember, we are
placing ourselves "in the condition of the men who made the
instrument." Remember also that nine years later the legislature-and a number of its members were the same men who drew
up the Constitution of 1818-enacted the statute above mentioned. In view of these facts, to hold that the men who drew
up the Constitution did not mean-and as reasonable men could
not have meant, that the jury were to judge both law and fact,
seems to be a ruling as arbitrary as it is unjustified.
But when we apply the same reasoning to the Statute of 1874
compared with the Constitution of 1870, the decision reached
by the Supreme Court seems little less than preposterous. For
the court says that when the people adopted a Constitution providing for a jury trial as "heretofore enjoyed" they did not
mean, and could not have meant, the jury trial as it had existed
during the previous forty-one years, but meant instead a jury
trial as it had never been conducted at any time, within the
state. And the Supreme Court finds that this is the only possible
construction to place upon this section.
The case of George v. People25 is cited by the court to show
that this constitutional provision refers to the jury as it existed
in England. And it is true that the court does make this statement, but the whole case can hardly be said to be an authority
for the decision in People v. Bruner. For it is plain that Mr.
Justice Craig never doubts for an instant the validity of the
statute before us.
At all events, this holding is squarely contradicted by a later
case, 26 in which it is said, "The right of trial by jury, which is
preserved by the Constitution, is the right as it had been enjoyed
24
25
26

7 Har. Law Rev. 150.
167 Il1. 447.
City of Spring Valley v. Spring Valley Coal Company, 173 Ill. 497.
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before the adoption of that instrument. . .
The question
whether a statute infringes the constitutional provision that the
right to trial by jury, as theretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate, raises a purely historical question and nothing else." Four
other cases 27 hold that the right to a jury trial guaranteed by
the Constitution of 1870 is the right as it existed at the time
of the adoption of that instrument.
Mr. Justice DeYoung cites two additional cases 28 to show that
the right guaranteed is the right as it was enjoyed in England.
But these cases actually hold that the right guaranteed by the
Constitution of 1870 is the right "as it existed at common law
and as it was enjoyed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution." In other words, the judges who wrote these opinions
evidently believed that even in England the common law jury
answered to both law and facts in criminal trials. So these
cases are really very far from supporting Mr. DeYoung's
finding.
To sum up, it is only by the most technical reasoning that
we can raise any doubt at all as to the meaning of the words
"heretofore enjoyed." And we have seen that it is the duty of
the court to determine doubtful questions of constitutionality
in favor of the validity of the statute. Here, the Supreme Court
has done precisely the opposite, overturning a line of cases that
began a hundred years ago.
In this view of the case, it is not necessary to determine
whether or not the statute contravenes that section of the Constitution which provides for the separation of the powers of
government into three distinct departments. For if it can be
shown that there is any possibility that the constitutional provision of 1870, "the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed," means to perpetuate the jury trial as it then existed
and always had existed in Illinois, the Statute of 1874 is merely
declaratory of the existing law.
The judge who delivered the opinion of the court advances
many cogent arguments to show that it is more practical and
reasonable for the court to determine the law than the jury,
and points out the many miscarriages of justice which may
result from the contrary rule. But this is all beside the point.
No authorities need be cited, however, to prove that there is no
sanction whatever for the doctrine that a law is unconstitutional
because it is unwise.
27Commercial Insurance Company v. Scammon, 123 Ill. 601; Borg
v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Ry. Co., 162 Ill. 348; Brewster
v. The People, 183 Ill. 143; Paulson v. The People, 195 Ill. 507.
28 Sinopoli v. Chicago Railways Co., 316 Ill. 609; Liska v. Chicago
Railways Co., 318 Ill. 570.
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REPORT OF A PHYSICIAN APPOINTED BY A COURT TO EXAMINE
A CLAIMANT IN A WORKMEN 'S COMPENSATION CASE AS THE BASIS

a recent case in the Supreme Court
of Kansas' the court had before it the much discussed and disputed question of a witness's privilege to give testimony of a
defamatory nature in a judicial proceeding.
FOR AN ACTION OF LIBEL.-In

In a previous case on which this action of libel is based the
plaintiff, here, Bert J. Mickens, had recovered a judgment in a
Workmen's Compensation action against his employers, the Laurence Paper and Manufacturing Co. After the rendition of
the judgment the court appointed tle defendant, here, J. S.
Davis, a physician, to examine the plaintiff and determine
whether his disability was still existing, and whether it was
permanent or partial, and report the result of such inquiry.
The plaintiff on such order submitted to an examination in
pursuance of said order of court at Ottawa, Kansas. Interrogatories were submitted and defendant physician in answer to
interrogatory number five which was: "State what the disability is, and the direct effect that any existing disability has on
Bert J. Mickens's ability to perform any work?" To which the
defendant answered: "Spinal cord lesion. Apparently due to
syphilis. This is a progressive lesion and he will probably never
be any better than he is now. "
The plaintiff then brought the action under consideration
charging the physician with libel. The plaintiff set forth in
his petition that the statement made was false and that it was
made with a malicious intent to injure him. To this petition
the defendant demurred and in argument the plaintiff set up
that the privilege should have been pleaded specially, but on this
point the court said: "If the plaintiff himself assert in his
petition facts which establish the privileged character of the
words complained of, be asserts nonliability of the defendant,
and there is no reason for the court to decline to entertain a
demurrer." In sustaining the demurrer the court quoted from
Marney v. Joseph'2 as follows: "It is first contended that the
defamatory statements in question belong in the class called
absolute privilege. This privilege is founded on public policy
and provides immunity for those engaged in the public service
and in the enactment and administration of law. It is not
intended so much for the protection of those engaged in that
service as it is for the promotion of the public welfare; the
purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts,
jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely
1 Mickens v. Davis et al., 132 Kan. 49.
2 94 Kan. 18.
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and exercise their respective functions without incurring the
risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for recovery of
damages."
Inasmuch as this case was disposed of on demurrer the decision admits that the words written were malicious, and that
they were written with knowledge of their falsity by the witness.
There is no question as to their relevancy to the case at issue,
nor as to whether it was a judicial proceeding, as it is made
so by statute in Kansas. Hence the question decided on here
was clearly: "Will an action for libel lie against a witness in
a judicial proceeding for statements made in answer to interrogatories propounded by the court where the same are made by
a witness with knowledge of their falsity and with malicious
intent, where the answers are relevant to the issues ?"
It is interesting to note the development of the doctrine of
privilege of a witness in a judicial proceeding and the reasons
for its allowances as a defense. In Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby3,
a leading English case on the subject, in answer to a question
put by the Lord Chancellor, the consulted judges replied: "A
long series of decisions has settled that no action will lie against
a witness for what he says or writes in giving evidence before
a court of justice. This does not proceed on the ground that
the occasion rebuts the prima facie presumption that words
disparaging to another are maliciously spoken or written. If
this were all, evidence of express malice would remove this
ground. But the principle, we apprehend, is that public policy
requires that witnesses should give their testimony free from
any fear of being harassed by an action on an allegation,
whether true or false, that they acted from malice."
Again in Seaman v. Netherclift,4 another leading English
case, Chief Justice Cockburn states the English view wherein
he says: "If there is anything as to which the authority is
overwhelming, it is that a witness is privileged to the extent of
what he says in course of his examination. Neither is that privilege affected by the relevancy or irrelevancy of what he says;
for then he would be obliged to judge of what is relevant or
irrelevant, and questions might be, and are, constantly asked
which are not strictly relevant to the issue. But that, beyond
all question, this unqualified privilege extends to a witness is
established by a long series of cases, the last of which is Dawkins
v. Lord Rokeby, after which to contend to the contrary is hopeless. It was there expressly decided that the evidence of a witness, with reference to the inquiry [the inquiry referred to being
3L. R. 7 H. L. 744.
4 L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 53.
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proceedings before a military court of inquiry instituted to
investigate the conduct of an officer] is privileged, notwithstanding it may be malicious; and to ask us to decide to the contrary
is to ask what is beyond our power. But I agree that if in this
case, beyond being spoken maliciously, the words had not been
spoken in the character of a witness, or not while he was giving
evidence in the case, the result might have been different. For
I am very far from desiring to be considered as laying down
as law that what a witness states altogether out of the character and sphere of a witness, or what he may say dehors the
matter in hand, is necessarily protected."
Starkie, 5 speaking of the reason for this privilege, says: "Witnesses, like jurors, appear in court in obedience to the authority
of the law, and therefore may be considered, as well as jurors,
to be acting in the discharge of a public duty; and though
convenience requires that they should be liable to a prosecution
for perjury committed in the course of their evidence, or for
conspiracy in case of a combination of two or more to give false
evidence, they are not responsible in a civil action for any reflections thrown out in delivering their testimony."
Again, Townsend6 gives the following reason for the privilege:
"The due administration of justice requires that a witness should
speak, according to his belief, the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, without regard to the consequences; and
he should be encouraged to do this by the consciousness that,
except for any willfully false statement, which is perjury, no
matter that his testimony may in fact be untrue, or that loss
to another ensues by reason of his testimony, no action for
slander can be maintained against him. It is not simply a
matter between individuals, it concerns the administration of
justice. The witness speaks in the hearing and under the control of the court, is compelled to speak, with no right to decide
what is material or what is immaterial; and he should not be
subject to the possibility of an action for his words."
It would appear from the English cases that the witness's
privilege is an absolute one whether relevant to the issue or not.
In the United States only two jurisdictions seem to have adopted
the broad English rule, namely, Maryland and Kentucky.
In the former state, the case of tIunckel v. Voneiff, 7 dealt with
disputed property. A witness was asked to fix a certain date,
and she replied as follows: "Not knowing that a mistress or
woman of Mr. Plitt would step in to claim the lawful wife's
5 Starkie, Slander and Libel, I, 242.
6 Townsend, Slander and Libel, sec. 223.
7 69 Md. 179.
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property, I did not keep an account of the date that way. If I
would have, I would have noticed the date and all those little
particular incidents . . . ". By holding such statement privileged the Maryland court appears to follow the English rule
of absolute privilege, although the court bases its decision on
the ground that the answer was not irrelevant to the issue.
In the Kentucky case of Sebree v. Thompson 8 the court seems
to follow the English rule of absolute privilege of a witness.
Here a deed, absolute on its face, was sought to be adjudged
a mortgage. The defendant was called as a witness and testified each allegation made by plaintiff was false and further that
plaintiff knew them to be false when swearing to them. In a
suit for slander brought by the plaintiff the defendant set up
his privilege as a defense. The judgment of the lower court
for the plaintiff was reversed by the Supreme Court, which held
that the privilege of a witness was an absolute one.
Illinois had the question presented in Fagan v. Fries9 wherein
it was held that in an action by a discharged employee to recover
damages from his employer on account of his discharge, testimony of the employer was privileged, and could not be made
the basis of a recovery for slanderous words. In deciding this
case the Maryland case of Hunckel v. Voneiff was given by the
court as authority for their decision. But in the Illinois case
there is no doubt that the alleged slanderous words were relevant to the case at issue.
Again, in McDavitt v. Boyer 0 it was held that a witness's
material statement charging the plaintiff with perjury was absolutely privileged. It is difficult to determine whether Illinois
in the proper case would follow the strict English rule or the
American majority rule that the testimony given must be relevant to the case. From the statements of the court in the later
case it would appear that the statements of the witness must
be material to be privileged.
New York follows the majority rule in qualifying the testimony
to relevant matter. In Allen v. Crofoot,11 an action for slander
was brought against the defendant for testimony given before
a justice in the examination of the plaintiff on a criminal charge
filed by the defendant. The court held that the hearing before
the magistrate, though informal and preliminary to a further
investigation by him, was such a judicial proceeding as might
cause the defendant to consider it his duty to answer the question asked. It was held, further, that it was a question of fact
8126 Ky. 223.

9 30 Il1. App. 236.
10 169 Ill.
475.
112 Wend. (N. Y.) 515.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

whether the words were spoken under such circumstances that
the defendant had reason to believe, and did in good faith
believe, that it was incumbent on him to repeat, at the time, the
charge in his complaint.
Again in New York the question was raised in Garr v.
Selden,12 where it appeared that an action had been brought
by an attorney for services. His clients pleaded the general
issue, and gave notice that on the trial they would show that
the services were so negligently and improperly rendered as to
be of no value. The attorney moved the court to strike out
this part of the notice as false and scandalous; whereupon the
clients made an affidavit stating that the attorney had revealed
confidential communications made to him in his professional
capacity, with respect to the services for which he was seeking
to recover compensation, and that such confidential communications were revealed to aid a person with an interest adverse to
his clients. In an action for libel brought by the attorney the
court decided that the defamatory matter in the affidavit was
material to the issue raised by the attorney's objection to the
notice, and that therefore it was privileged.
3
In Nelson v. Davis"
it was held, that an unsworn statement
by a defendant in a criminal case, impeaching the testimony
of a witness against him, was absolutely privileged. The court
said: "Freedom of speech on the part of the defendant in the
preservation of his rights demands that he shall have immunity
from actions for damages, on like grounds as those on which
public policy requires that every witness should be left free to
speak fearlessly the truth, without being in peril of being subjected to damages."
In iutchinson v. Lewis14 it was held that a statement made
by a witness after testifying, and outside the court room, could
not be made the basis of an action for slander, if such statements were slanderous only when interpreted in the light of
material testimony by the speaker in court. This, however, is
carrying the privilege of a witness to speak slanderous words
farther than the majority of the states are willing to go.
It is well established in the United States that a witness, in
answering a question asked by court or counsel, is not bound
to determine its materiality or relevancy to the issues of the
cause in which he is testifying. If his testimony is responsive
to a question, or no objection is made to it, or an objection to it
has been overruled, no action for libel or slander can be maintained en account of the testimony, even though it is defama12 4 N.

Y. 91.

13

9 Ga. App. 131.

14

75 Ind. 55.

CHICAGO-KENT

REVIEW

tory, immaterial, and given maliciously. This doctrine appears
in Calkins v. Sumner1" wherein the parties to a dispute agreed
to submit their differences to arbitrators for settlement, and
the defendant was called before the arbitrators to impeach the
testimony of one of the contestants. On cross-examination, he
was asked why he would not believe the plaintiff, one of the
contestants, under oath, and also if he had ever heard him sworn.
To which he relied, "I never heard him swear but once. In a
case between myself and him for sand, he swore it on me. I
thought he would swear to the truth, but he swore to a lie."
It was held that since the answer was responsive to a question
by counsel to which no objection was made, or which was not
ruled out by the tribunal, no action could be maintained for the
defamation. The court said: "I think the correct rule in regard
to a witness's liability to an action for what he may say pending
his examination before a judicial tribunal, is that he is not answerable in damages for any statements he may make which are
responsive to questions put to him, and which are not objected
to and ruled out by the court, or concerning the impertinency
or impropriety of which he receives no advice from the court or
tribunal before which the proceeding is had. . . . We all
know that a great majority of the persons called upon to testify
in our courts of justice are wholly ignorant of the rules of evidence by which legal proceedings are governed; and that if they
were not, they are, in most instances, unacquainted with the
true nature of the controversy and the exact legal condition of
the issue between the parties, so that they could not determine
for themselves the materiality or pertinency of their answers to
particular questions propounded. Besides it is not for them to
decide such questions. The law has imposed that duty exclusively on courts, and others having authority to hear and determine disputed questions of law and fact. Witnesses do and must
rely on the conduct of courts and counsel engaged, and in the
absence of objection or warning, ought to be permitted, without
fear of harm or molestation, to make truthful and direct responses to all questions which may be put to them.
It appears from the foregoing cases that Kansas, in deciding
that where the malicious words spoken are relevant to the case
has followed a long line of American authority on the subject.
The writer believes the American rule, which qualifies the privilege to relevant testimony in all cases except where the testimony, though irrelevant, is responsive to a question and is not
objected to by counsel (or the objection is overruled by the
court) is a much safer rule than the English one, which extends
the privilege to all irrelevant matter.
15 13 Wis. 215.

